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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah, which has been transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
pursuant to 78-2a-3(k) Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1992. 
This is an action originating in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, involving 
a probate matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE 
ISSUES 
1. The whole of this appeal is a challenge to the 
Court's interpretation of Utah Code Annotated, 30-1-4.5 as 
Amended in 1987. The standard of review is a question of 
law, and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to 
the lower court's determination. Kimball vs. Campbell, 
699 P.2d 714, (Utah, 1985). 
2. To have a common law marriage, the parties must 
act and treat one another as if in a marriage, and not merely 
as partners enjoying pre-marital sexual relations. The standard 
of review is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness 
with no deference to the lower Court's determination, Kimball 
supra. 
3. According to the statute, the decedent could have 
had an administrative determination that she was in fact in 
in a common law marriage, yet on every occasion when dealing 
with administrative agencies, she claimed under oath that she 
was in fact not married. The standard of review is a question 
of law, and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to 
to the lower Court*s determination. Kimball, supra. 
4. The statute requires that the "marriage" arise out 
of a contract between two consenting parties. The standard 
of review is a question of law, and is reviewed for correctness 
with no deference to the lower Court's determination. Kimball 
supra, 
5. The decedent and Mr. Van Nood, did not assume 
marital rights. The standard of review is a question of law, 
and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower 
Court's determination. Kimball, supra. 
6. The decedent and Mr. Van Nood, did not assume 
marital duties. The standard of review is a question of law, 
and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower 
Court's determination. Kimball, supra, 
7• The decedent and the Appellee did not mutually assume 
marital obligations. The standard of review is a question of law, 
and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower 
Court's determination. Kimball, supra. 
8. The Appellee and the decedent did not hold themselves 
out as husband ans wife. The standard of review is a question of 
law, and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower 
Court's determination. Kimball, supra. 
9. The Appellee and the decedent did not acquire a uniform 
reputation as husband and wife. The standard of review is a question 
of law, and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the 
lower Court's determination. Kimball, supra. 
10. The Appellee and the decedent did not acquire a general 
reputation as husband and wife. The standard of review is a question 
of law, and i s reviewed for correctness with no deference to the 
lower Court 's determination. Kimball, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
30-1-4.5 VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE NOT SOLEMNIZED 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to 
this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or 
administrative order establishes that it arises out of 
a contract between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized 
marriage under the provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabitated; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties and 
obligations, and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a 
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage 
under this section must occur during the relationship 
described in Subsection (1), or within one year following 
the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a 
marriage recognizable under this section may be manifested 
in any form, and may be proved under the same general rules 
of evidence as facts in other cases. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal, stemming from a trial on whether a Mr. 
Martin Van Nood, was in fact the common law husband of the decedent 
Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant, Orin Thomas Sorensen, filed a Petition to 
Determine that the Decedent died intestate, and to have himself 
appointed as the Personal Representative. A Mr. Martin Van Nood 
and Melvin Gustaveson filed a Counter-Petition objection to the 
Petition of the Appellant and requesting that Mr. Van Nood be 
appointed the Personal Representative. 
The matter came on regularly before the Probate Judge assigned 
at the time, who was Judge Richard Moffat, and since there was an 
objection filed, the Court transferred the matter to the trial 
calendar. The underlying Judge assigned to the case, was the same 
Judge Richard Moffat., 
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
The matter came on regularly for trial, and after the same 
the lower Court held that the decedent was in a common law marriage 
with Mr. Martin Van Nood, and therefore he was entitled to inherit 
the entire estate. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson, died on October 19, 1992, 
leaving no living father, mother, sister or issue. Her sole sur-
viving blood relative is Appellant, Orin Thomas Sorensen. 
Susan Gustaveson married a William Gustaveson, and they 
divorced on February 22, 1982, with no children stemming from 
the said marriage. 
The Decedent dated a Mr. Martin Van Nood, and they began 
living together. However, their relationship was somewhat rocky 
as she moved in with him, and then lived with someone else, and 
moved back in with Mr. Van Nood. Transcript at page 40. 
Appellee had given the Decedent an engagement ring, and they 
contemplated getting married sometime before May of 1997, and in 
fact they were looking at houses together so that when they got 
married they could move into "their" home. 
Appellee and the Decedent did not assume any marital rights, 
duties or obligations as husband and wife, and they did not hold 
themselves out as nor had they acquired a uniform and general 
reputation as husband and wife, under the interpretation given 
30-1-4.5, which the Appellant believes the State Legislature, 
intended. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
In this Appeal, the Appellant submits that the State 
Legislature intended a whole different meaning to 30-1-4.5 than 
given by the lower Court. 
Appellant submits that it was the intent of the State Legis-
lature to recognize commitments made between consenting adults, when 
the said commitments were in the nature of permanent relationship 
between the same. Hence, each of the five elements were designed 
to reflect an element of permanency, where the parties would do 
acts that would reflect a permanent relationship with their partners. 
Therefore, the State Legislature required that the parties 
do what other married couples do, like borrow money together, own 
assets jointly, and have common debts, etc. 
None of these long term elements was present, and hence 
each of the issues raised by the Appellant is a question of law, 
in that, did the Legislature require more than merely what the 
lower Court rely on, when deciding it was a common law marriage. 
ARGUMENT ONE 
THE WHOLE OF THIS APPEAL IS A CHALLENGE TO THE 
COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
30-1-4.5 AS AMENDED IN 1987 
In this action, Appellant does not challenge the 
FINDINGS OF FACT, in so far as they address the facts received 
into evidence regarding what the Appellee and the Decedent may 
have done before the decedent died on October 19, 1992. 
However, these facts are not what the State Legislature 
contemplated in determining what constitutes a common law 
marriage. 
Appellant submits that the State Legislature contemplated 
a whole lot more than merely living together for any period of 
time and cleaning house, fixing meals, taking out the garbage, etc. 
Appellant submits that the State Legislature contemplated 
actions that went beyond the day to day living of two people 
shacking up together, and required that there be actions by the 
parties that reflect a bonding into the future, or a commitment 
to one another that was more lasting than merely paying a past 
due light bill together. 
Appellant submits that the State Legislature contemplated 
something beyond a mere convenient sharing of household expenses 
and shopping together, and exchanging gifts. 
It is clear that what the State Legislature contemplated 
was that the parties share checking accounts, savings accounts, 
purchase items like cars, or real property, etc., together, 
reflecting a relationship tommorrow, not just what is convenient 
today. 
In this case, essentially each and every FINDING, in 
FINDING OF FACT #7, regarding the parties "mutually assuming 
marital rights, duties and obligations" involves merely two 
people who were living together, contemplating getting married 
someday, perhaps someday soon, sharing the costs of a household, 
until such time as they would become married to each other: 
a. They engaged in a sexual relationship. 
b. They maintained their home together for themselves 
for four and one-half years; and they raised the minor daughter 
of the respondent together for three years, until she married 
and moved from the family home. The decedent treated respondent's 
daughter as her own daughter, and considered respondent's 
grandchild as her own grandchild. 
c. Each contributed financial support to the 
household expenses; and they purchased furniture and home 
improvements for themselves. 
d. They received mail together. 
e. They exchanged gifts with each other and family 
members; and received gifts from family members. 
f. They shared in the normal household duties 
of a married couple: cooking, cleaning, home repairs, care 
of a child, travel, entertainment both in the home and attendance 
of social activities outside of the home with friends and co-
workers . 
g. The decedent contributed financial support to 
the respondent's business by purchasing the business computer. 
h. They shared activities as husband and wife with 
respondent's child, such as camping, attendance as f,parentsfl 
at the child's highschool graduation, marriage, and birth of 
her child. 
Appellant submits that each and everyone of these 
findings are consistent with the engaged couple, contemplating 
marriage and moving in with eachother, prior to getting married. 
Appellant submits that the lower Court eried, in 
this loose interpretation of the Statute, as the State 
Legislature contemplated a situation where the parties are treating 
their relationship, as if they themselves have a commitment, 
without merely saying an flI do." 
For example, did the parties borrow money together 
reflecting that they were working together in the future with 
common goals and directions? 
Did the parties buy anying that involved a title, 
like a car or house, or boat, etc., showing that the parties 
contemplated a real future together. Or did the parties talk 
about buying a house together, like talking about getting married, 
and look at buying a house as an incident of their marriage, ie: 
lets get a house together when we get married. 
Did the parties share a joint savings or checking 
account? Showing that they had truly merged their individual 
interests into a common interest. 
Did the parties maintain separate debts and obligations. 
So when the decedent borrows money just months before she dies 
does she have a single debt of any kind, that the Appellee is 
also responsible for, and visa versa. 
The State Legislature contemplated that there be 
a mutual assumption of marital rights, duties and obligations 
and in this case the Court overlooked the expressed intent of 
the parties to get married, and concluded that since they 
had been having sex for so long, they were married. 
Appellant submits that the lower Court also erred, 
in reference to the interpretation of f,did the parties hold 
themselves out as and did they acquire a uniform and general 
reputation as husband and wife," as reflected in FINDING OF 
FACT #8: 
a. Neighbors considered them to be husband and wife. 
b. Fellow co-workers and the employer of the decedent 
and the former husband of the decedent and his parents regarded 
them as husband and wife. 
c. Travel arrangements were made as husband and wife. 
d. They shopped together as husband and wife for 
household wares, and for a new home. 
e. They held themselves out as husband and wife to 
their friends, relatives, and general public. 
Appellant submits that this loose interpretation of 
the statute by the lower Court, was also in error, in that this 
again was not directed to show that the parties were contemplating 
any kind of future together, and therefore the Court should 
recognize what the parties themselves have committed to one with 
another. 
For example, did they ever tell anyone that they 
were husband and wife, or did they in fact tell them that they 
were engaged. 
Did the parties represent when they borrowed money 
that they were married, or did they represent the very opposite 
of the same and state that they were in fact not married. 
Did the parties file their taxes consistent with a 
common law marriage, or did they file single returns and pay 
outrageously more tax, because they in fact did not hold them-
selves out as husband and wife. 
When the decedent filed for unemployment benefits 
just months before she died, did she state under oath that she 
was not married, and that there was no one living in her home 
with her? 
Did the parties always act consistent regarding 
their future together, showing a "uniform and general reputation 
as husband and wife" or did the decedent merely respond to a 
door to door salesman, on only one occasion, that she was Mrs. 
Van Nood? 
Appellant respectfully submits that this whole appeal 
is to the interpretation of the statute, and what the State 
Legislature contemplated, when they legitatriized two party's 
commitment to each other, without the formality of having 
said, "I do." 
Had this been a challenge to the FINDING OF FACT, then 
it would be the Appellant's burden to convince this Court that 
the FINDINGS OF FACT are not support by the evidence. Appellant 
"must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite the evidence, the trial court's findings 
are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight 
of the evidence', thus making them 'clearly erroneous'." In re 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d, 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting 
State vs. Walker, 743 P.2d, 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Also note 
Scharf vs. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), Harker 
vs. Condominium Forest Glen, Inc., 740, P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) . 
However, this is not a challenge to the FINDINGS 
OF FACT, it is rather a challenge to the CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
in that the lower Court wrongfully interpreted the provisions 
of 30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1987. 
A challenge to a question of law, or an interpretation of 
law, is reviewed for correctness, with no presumption in favor 
of the determination by the lower Court. Kimball vs. Campbell, 
699 P.2d 714, (Utah 1985). 
Appellant submits that the letter and spirit of 
30-1-4.5 requires that the parties treat each other and the world 
as if they were already married, and hence the Court should 
legitimatize and validate, what the parties themselves have 
committed to. 
Hence, the inquiry is what have the parties done 
regarding a commitment to the future together, which should be 
blessed by the Court of a valid, legal, marriage commitment. 
Appellant submits that the lower Court, merely 
looked at how long the parties had been living together, and 
what they had done with day to day expenses, without looking 
at all at the future commitment of the parties. 
Hence, the relationship of the parties was a mere 
engagement to be married, rather than a commitment of bond 
and unity, which deserved the acknowledgment of the Court. 
Appellant respectfully submits that this Court 
should review the interpretation of the provisions of 30-1-4.5 
for correctness and then reverse the determination of the lower 
Court, with instructions to probate the estate of the deceased, with 
the Brother, Orin Thomas Sorensen, as the sole heir. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
TO HAVE A COMMON LAW MARRIAGE, THE PARTIES MUST 
ACT AND TREAT ONE ANOTHER AS IF IN A MARRIAGE, 
AND NOT MERELY AS PARTNERS ENJOYING PRE-MARITAL 
SEXUAL RELATIONS 
Section 30-1-4.5, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
in 1987, contemplates that the parties consider their relationship 
a marriage. 
The Statute starts off at the very beginning with the 
phase "A marriage, which is not solemnized....11 
In this action there is no basis to conclude that the 
parties referred or even considered the relationship a marriage. 
At page 88 of the transcript, Martin Van Nood, himself 
referred to the relationship of the decedent and himself "as 
partners." 
On cross examination, Marin Van Nood, stated that he 
never told Melvin Gustaveson, the one who filled out the decedent's 
death certificate, that Martin and Susan were married. 
On page 86 of the transcript, on cross examination, 
Martin Van Nood stated as follows: 
Q. Did you ever tell Mel that the two of your were 
married you and Susan were married? 
A. No. 
Q. Did Susan ever tell Mel, "We're married."? 
A. I don't know. 
In fact, Martin Van Nood, stated under oath that 
he did not consider himself "married" to the decedent. 
On page 39, on cross examination, Martin Van Nood, 
stated as follows: 
Q. So you were going to get some -- married some 
time between May of f92 and May of f97? 
A. Yes. 
The decedent's friend Karen Gallegos, stated on 
page 95, that she considered herself the decedent's "best friend," 
on direct examination. 
Then on page 96 and page 97, Karen Gallegos on 
direct exaimination stated: 
Did you observe Susan wearing any jewelry? 
Yes. She wore a ruby and diamond ring --
And --
-- on her left hand. 
-- did she ever tell you what the ring symbolized? 
It was from Marty, is was real special. He gave 
it to her on Valentine's Day and it was an engagement. 
Martin Van Nood's witness Karen Gallegos, stated on 
page 101, that he and the decedent were fiances, when asked 
if Susan ever referred to Martin Van Nood as her husband? 
0. (by Mr. Dalgliesh) Did Susan, in her conversations 
with you, ever refer to Marty as anything other than her husband? 
A. She hated the term boyfriend. She never said 
boyfriend, she — when I was engaged, I liked to call -- like 
to call him my fiance, and she -- you know, and she would say, 
thatfs -- thatfs the right term, fiance. She hated the term 
boyfriend. 
On Cross examination, Karen Gallegos, stated that the 
relationship between the parties was not a marriage, but 
was "at best his fiance" and "not his wife." 
At page 103 is the following, in the transcript: 
Q. So she considered herself at best a fiance to 
Martin and not -- not his wife; isn't that correct.? 
A. Yes. 
This best friend of the decedent went on to say, that 
there was no "marriage" between the parties at the time that 
the decedent died, rather they were going to "get married," at 
a later time. 
At page 110, Karen Gallegos, stated on Cross examination: 
Q. You said that they met in September of '86? 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. Six years later, she's still merely a fiance to 
Marty; isnTt that correct? 
A. Well, they're not married; so yes. 
Karen Gallegos stated on page 111, that she was never 
present when the decedent ever told Melvin Gustaveson, the decedent's 
adopted father, that she and Martin Van Nood were married. 
As noted above this same Melvin Gustaveson was the 
one who filed out the death certificate for the decedent's family, 
and he stated therein that the decedent was divorced at the 
time of her death. Note Exhibit 16. 
In fact, this Karen Gallegoes goes so far under oath 
as to say, what conditions had to exist before the parties were 
going to in fact get married. 
At page 112, she stated as follows: 
0. Did she tell you when they were going to get 
di -- when they were going to get married? 
A. When she got a job and Marty got a job. 
Q. Prior to May of '92, did those two conditions 
exist at the same time. 
A. Prior to when11 
Q. May of '92 
A. Well, no, 'cause that -- she was losing her job. 
Not only did the decedent's best friend, Karen 
Gallegoes testify that the Martin Van Nood and Susan Gustaveson 
were not married, but so did Martin Van Nood's witness Kenneth 
Atkin, who had been the decedent's friend for many, many years, 
ast Kail Radio, where she worked. 
At page 138 of the transcript, Mr. Atkin, testified 
on cross examination, as follows: 
Q. You say that you know that they were not married? 
A. Right. 
Q, How do you know that? 
A. Well, because I know them both. I've known 
them both for a long time and I think I would have been invited 
to the wedding. I think. 
Q. Did they ever talk to you about wedding plans? 
A. Yeah. I -- I've heard Susan talk about that, 
uh huh. 
Q. And that would be some -- do you know when they 
were going to get married? 
A. I have no idea. 
Martin Van Nood called Julia Tso, his own daughter 
to testify. She had actually lived with the decedent and Martin 
Van Nood for some time. 
At page 143, Julia Tso testified as follows: 
Q. Were you aware of plans for them to get married? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When were they going to get married? 
A. I only know that they talked about it. 
Q. Do you know if they ever set any time when they 
were going to get married? 
A. I -- I don't know of a time. 
Q. Did they consider one another fiances? 
A. Yes. 
Appellant submits that the State Legislature mandated 
that for there to be a common law marriage, the relationship must 
be one in the nature of a marriage. 
Appellee testified under oath that they were partners 
and that they did not consider themselves Mmarriedff, but that 
they were thinking of marriage at a future date. 
Appellee even gave the decedent a diamond ring, which 
was considered by all that testified to the same as an engagement 
ring, symbolizing the commitment to in fact "get married.11 
Appellant submits that the whole basis for determining 
whether or not a common law marriage ever existed is based upon 
the statute with specific requirements, and that the first of 
which, that was not met by the Appellee, was proof that the parties 
relationship, was a umarriageff to the two parties concerned. 
Not only did the APpellee fail in his proof of the 
same, by the parties themselves, but everyone, who testified 
as to the same, testifed that a marriage was in the future, 
sometime before May of 1997, and not at the time of the decedent's 
death. 
By virtue of the very specific language of the 
statute, and the same being absolutely the only basis for 
determining that the parties were in fact in a common law marriage, 
Appellant respectfully requests that the lower Court be reversed, 
and that the undisputed only living blood relative, Orin Thomas 
Sorensen, be declared the sole heir of the estate. 
ARGUMENT THREE 
ACCORDING TO THE STATUTE, THE DECEDENT COULD HAVE 
HAD AN ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION THAT SHE WAS IN 
FACT IN AN COMMON LAW MARRIAGE, YET ON EVERY OCCASION 
WHEN DEALING WITH ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, SHE CLAIMED 
UNDER OATH THAT SHE WAS IN FACT NOT MARRIED. 
Section 30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended in 1987, states in part as follows: 
(1) A marriage which is not soleminized according 
to this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or 
administrative order establishes . . . ,! (emphasis added.) 
According to Exhibit 23, submitted by the Appellant, 
there is no question that the decedent filed her income taxes 
as a single woman. 
The Decedent made in excess of thirty thousand dollars, 
and could have had the I.R.S. evaluate her marital status, so 
that she could have had substantial savings in taxes, yet chose 
to have the I.R.S. consider her as single, with no question 
or issue raised with the I.R.S. 
Appellee testified that the decedent could not 
honestly claim anything different than single with the I.R.S. 
At page 65, Appellee testified on direct examination 
as follows: 
Q. Susan filed a joint, or an individual income tax 
return for 1991. Do you know why? 
A. Well, she was a very honest, forthright person 
and I -- she felt that, in the first place, the I.R.S. probably 
wouldn't accept as a -- as part of joint return. And we did 
discuss -- she was in a very high tax bracket being classified 
as single and she made decent money at work, and so paid a lot 
of taxes, but didnft get much back. We discussed several --
several methods that we could get her a better tax break.. 
We talked about joint returns but that didn't seem like one 
of the feasibilities, but were other methods that we talked 
about that night -- would have helped her. 
Under the clear mandate of the State Legislature, that 
one can have their relationship declared a valid marriage, 
but only did the decedent intentionally not do the same on a 
federal level, she claimed the exact same "not married" status 
a matter on the State level as well. 
On July 6, 1992, just months before Susan Gustaveson 
died, she applied for unemployment benefits from the State of 
Utah. 
In doing so, she signed Exhibit #2, under oath, declaring 
that the basis, in part for her benefits, was that she was not 
"married" and not "single" and not "separated" and not "widowed", 
but that she was in fact, "divorced." 
One would think that she could have enhanced her claim 
for benefits by claiming that she had others to support, and 
therefore much more in need of the unemployment benefits. 
As will be noted elsewhere in this brief, she did 
not either fill out the application as a "Van Nood", nor sign 
the document as a "Van Nood", and furthermore, she stated 
that her name was "Gustaveson" which was the name of her first 
husband, and that she was in fact "divorced" at the time of 
filing in July 1992. 
Appellant submits that the decedent, on every 
occasion, involving all of the evidence before the lower Court, 
when called upon to certify under oath to any "administrative" 
agency, certified her marital status, as divorced/single as she 
everytime stated under oath that she was not married. 
Surely there can be no question that she would have 
reaped substantial dividends from the I.R.S. if should could 
claim either the benefit of Joint Return, or the benefit of 
additional dependents. 
Appellee testifed that there were substantial gains 
to be had, had the decedent been able to legitimately claim that 
she was filing a joint return, etc. The statute is absolutely 
clear that she could have so claimed, still Appellee stated that 
she did in fact, not do the same, because she was honest, and 
could not claim the benefit of being "married" because she in 
fact was not married. 
The lower Court wholly ignored this undisputed 
evidence. Evidence, Appellant submits, is the decedent's own 
sworn statements, either prepared by her own hand, or by her agent 
at her instructions, and in the case of the unemployment benefits, 
just a few short months before she died. 
Appellant submits that it is the statute that mandates 
the terms and condition of whether or not a common law marriage 
existed, and the statute is absolutely clear that the marriage 
can be determined by "administrative order11, yet the decedent 
clearly chose to remain not married, when substantial sums were 
at risk, and in fact surely lost, by decedent1s overt sworn state-
ments that she was in fact not married. 
Appellant respectfully submits that there is no basis 
for this Court to ignore the undisputed sworn statements by the 
decedent that she was in fact not married, immediately before 
she died, and therefore this Court should reverse, with instructions 
that the Appellant is the sole survivor of the estate. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
THE STATUTE REQUIRES THAT THE "MARRIAGE" ARISE OUT 
OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN TWO CONSENTING PARTIES. 
The State Legislature, mandated that the marriage re-
lationship arise out of a contract between consenting parties. 
In this action, the relationship between the parties was 
without any question, was a contract to get married, rather 
than a contract of existing marria,ge. 
On page 64, Appellee testified that he purchased an 
engagement ring for the decedent, and that it represented their 
contract. Then on page 69, he stated that getting married was 
"in our future plans." 
Then on page 72, the Appellee testified that they had 
not set a specific date, by the time that she had died, but had 
instead established a time interval. 
Q. So she decided against, at least for now, up 
to the time she died, she was against getting married to you; is 
that correct? 
A. No. That's not correct. 
Q. Then was is correct then that she wanted to get 
married to you then? 
A, We had it in out plans, yes. 
Q. Had you set a date: 
A. No. We did have a time interval, but not a date. 
On page 88 and following the Appellee further explains 
when the parteis intended to be married: 
Q. So in 1988, you start talking about it, she dies 
October f92 and she's still not agreeing to get married fair? 
A. No, I don't think so. 
Q. You hadn't set a date? 
A. We'd set a time frame. 
Q. You set a time frame that you were going to get 
married? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when was that? 
A. We have a five -year plan that called for 
solemnization of our relationship.) 
Q. So when were you going to get married? 
A. We had no date, 
Q. And when did the five years begin? 
A. May of '92. 
Q. So you were going to get some-married some time 
between May of '92 and May of !97? 
A. Yes. 
Appellant submits that it is crystal clear, that had 
the parties felt that they were married and husband and wife, etc., 
nothing further was needed. 
Appellee testified that saying "I do11 was too hard, 
and it was very undesirable to both the Appellee and the decedent, 
yet it was something that both felt was necessary. 
Hence, the inescapeable conclusion is that they knew they 
did not have a legal, valid marriage, because of the undisputed 
evidence. 
Even is one were to state that their ignorance of the 
statutory law is an excuse, they surely were aware of the pre-
vailing notion in America of what is thought of as a common law 
wife and a common law husband. 
The lower Court in its ruling from the Bench placed 
great significance on whether the decedent and the Appellee even 
knew of the statute. 
Appellant submits that their knowledge or lack of 
knowledge of the subject statute is of no importance, as the 
State Legislature sets forth the criteria to be strickly adhered 
to, and in the conjunctive no less, and whether someone is aware 
of the difference factors or not, makes no difference whatsoever. 
It is the facts as they were between the decedent and 
the Appellee, as applied against the law, not the otherrwayaround. 
Hence, they either had a ,Tmarriage!! that would "arise 
out of a contract11 or they did not, and in this case there is just 
absolutely no question that the engagement ring was just that, "an 
engagement ring." One I am sure was cherished by the decedent, as 
reflected in the testimony of Karen Gallegoes, but at best they 
were engaged, and perhaps even promised to each other, but married 
thay were not, as the "contract" was one in the nature of a 
commitment to "get married" rather than one of "already being 
married." 
Appellant respectfully requests that the determination 
by the lower Court be reversed, with instructions to the lower 
Court, to establish the Appellant as the sole heir of the decedentfs 
estate. 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
THE DECEDENT AND MR. VAN NOOD, DID NOT ASSUME 
MARITAL RIGHTS 
In this action, the parties did not assume any 
marital rights with each other. 
When it came to them having a joint ZC1II,credit card, 
the decedent had the same in her name only. Note Exhibit 1. As 
to the R.C. Willey account to purchase furnishings and furniture 
the decedent had the same in her name only. Note Exhibit 4. As 
to the ownership of the items of real property, Mr. Van Nood held 
his property in his name only, and the decedent held her Condo in 
her name only. Exhibit 5. When it was time to finance the 
home of the decedent, she was the only signature on the loan, and 
Mr. Van Nood had no part of the benefits of the same. Note 
Exhibit 6. As to the benefit of a Cheveron charge card, Mr. Van 
Nood had no benefits from the same, as it was in the decedents name 
only. Note Exhibit #8. The decedent had two charge accounts for 
Double Day Book Club, which Mr. Van Nood had no benefit or 
right to use. Note Exhibit #11. The decedent had an account 
at Tel America, which was solely in her name, Note Exhibit #15. 
The decedent had an account at yasatch Mountain Credit Union, 
which was solely for her and not Mr. Van Nood, nor the both of 
them. Note Exhibit #19. Even the Utah Power and Light account 
was in the decedent's name only. Exhibit #20. 
One may argue that she had these accounts before and 
merely never got around to putting the same in their joint names. 
However, this argument is without merit, because Mr. Van Nood 
claimed to be flmarriedM to the decedent dating back to 1988, some 
four full years before she died. As noted in the record many 
of the accounts were updated in the later years of her life, with 
no attempt to make them joint accounts. 
As noted above, the decedent did not claim to be 
married nor to have any dependants (as noted in the transcript 
Mr. Van Nood was out of a job) when she filed her income tax 
for the year 1992. 
Perhaps the most telling reason why the lower Court 
erred, in reference to "mutually assume marital rights11 is found 
in Exhibit #18. 
According to this exhibit, the decedent applied for 
a loan with Trans West Credit Union, on May 5, 1992, some four 
months or so before she died. 
In this application for a loan, she stated that her 
name was "Gustaveson" and not Van Nood. She listed no Mco-maker 
or joint owner." She put nothing in the slot for "No of Dependents." 
She listed her car only, when there was a slot for her car and 
any co-maker or joint owner's car. (This would be a substantial 
omitance, because this is to be anunsecured loan.) Where it 
calls for "Nearest relative - not living with youM she lists 
Appellant, and then in reference to "Name & Address of Personal 
+ Not a relative" she list the Appellee, with his address and 
his phone number, which is different than the ones listed for 
herself. 
As to the Credit information, and Outstanding Debts, 
she does not list a single debt of Mr. Van Nood, as will be 
discussed below. 
Towards the and of Exhibit #18, the Decedent stated "No" 
when asked if "Are you a guarantor or co-maker of any leases, 
contracts or debts." 
The decedent was a sophisticated person, and was well 
aware of how lending institutions rely on credit information, 
as she was trained as a Real Estate Agent. Note the transcript 
at page 28. 
This becomes even more significant, because she refused 
to put Mr. Van Noodfs name on her Condo, as did Mr. Van Nood 
refuse to put her name on his house. Note the transcript at 
page 43. 
On page 76 in the transcript, Mr. Van Nood stated that 
he had not even seen the Exhibit #18 until it was supplied to him, 
through discovery, yet on the following page she admits that 
the purpose of the loan was to make changes to the Condo, which 
was exclusively in her name. 
On page 80 of the transcript the Appellee was asked 
about any debts, contracts or leases that involved him and the 
decedent, and he admitted that there were none. 
Q. Okay. Now, let me concentrate there. She told 
the truth then in May 5th, 1992, that she didnft have any joint 
applications for debts, contracts or leases with you? 
A. None with me. 
Then on page 86 and 87 of the transcript the Appellee 
stated the following: 
Q. Did the two of you own any land or buildings 
together? 
A. No. We didn't. 
Q. Did you own any personal property together? 
A. We bought household goods together, so I guess 
ownership would be joint. 
Q. 
and her name? 
A. 
something? 
Did you ever have any titles that were in your name 
That would mean like real property or vehicles or 
Q. Anything you need a title for. 
A. Anything you need a title for? I don't -- I 
can't think of anything. 
Q. Any you told us that you didn't have joint checking 
accounts? 
No joint accounts. 
No joint savings accounts? 
No. No joint credit --
No joint credit cards? 
Correct. 
Appellee called his business partner Mr. Harley Sells 
to testify, who stated on page 122 of the transcript that the 
decedent never took on any business debt of Mr. Van Nood, and 
had no imput in the business decisions of Mr. Van Nood. 
Appellant submits that when the State Legislature, pened 
the elements of 30-1-4.5 (d) involving ffmutually assume marital 
rights. . ." they really keyed into when there is and when there 
is no common law marriage, because in this case, the ownership of 
a home together, was clearly and incident of marriage to the 
decedent and the Appellee. 
On page 118, the Appellee's business partner Mr. Harley 
Sells, testified on direct as follows: 
Q did they ever ask you, sir, to help them in 
their domestic life? 
A. Yes. They asked me to contact a realtor for them 
they were going to buy a house together. And I contacted a 
realtor, arid.that -- she did drive them around looking at houses. 
Then on cross examination, on pages 122 and 123, the 
same Mr. Sells testified as follows: 
Q. Do you know if they contemplated actually getting 
married at some time? 
A. Yes, I believe I do. 
Q. When were they going to get married? 
A. I don't know when, but the real estate agent did 
comment to me later that they had talked of marriage in their 
car, in her car, while they were looking at houses. 
Hence, Appellant submits that this falls squarely into 
the notions promulgated by the State Legislature, in that they 
were getting a home as part of their immediate future plans, just 
like they would be getting married in their immediate future plans, 
and that was why Appellee had given the decedent an engagement 
ring. 
Appellant submits that this clear incident of marriage 
was futuristic, just as were their marriage plans, and hence, they 
were not already in a common law marriage, and the lower Court must 
be reversed, with instructions to probate the estate of the decedent 
with the Appellant as the sole heir. 
ARGUMENT SIX 
THE DECEDENT AND MR. VAN NOOD, DID NOT ASSUME 
MARITAL DUTIES 
Not only as stated in Argument Five above, did the 
Appellee state that they had no mutuality in "marital rights,ff 
he confirmed the same on page 44 of the transcript on direct 
examination by Mr. Dalgleish: 
Q. You and Susan -- did you and Susan maintain joint 
or separate financial accounts? 
A. Separate. 
Q. Did you have any j o i n t accounts? 
A. No. 
Appellant submits that not only did the decedent and 
Mr. Van Nood have no mutuality in T?marital rights11, they 
similarly had no mutuality in f,marital duties." 
They not only considered their property as being 
absolutely separate when it came time to repair the automobile 
of Mr. Van Nood Susan Gustaveson paid for the same, and then 
Appellee paid her back. Not at all like a husband and wife. Note 
page 49, where the Appellee is testifying on direct examination: 
Q. Did you have dealings, you and Susan, with Morgan's 
Sportscar West? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what dealings was that? 
A. Well, Susan and I belonged to the British Motorcar 
Club, primarily cause I — I own a British automobile, and she 
was kind enough while I was in Wyoming to take it in for servicing. 
Q. And who paid for that? 
A. I -- I did, I -- but I think I -- I think she 
paid for it and then I reimbursed her is how it worked. 
Q. I'll show you what's been marked as Defendant's 
Exhibit 6 and ask you what that is? 
A, Well, it's a work order made out to Marty Van 
Nood - Susan, made out by Mike Morgan, one of the partners in 
the car repair shop. 
Q. And do you recognize Susan's signature? 
A. That is her signature. 
According to the Appellee himself, not only were 
the decedent and Mr. Van Nood careful about keeping their rights 
and obligations separate when it came to personal property, he 
also testified that such was the case with all of their property. 
On page 78 of the transcript, Mr. Van Nood testified 
on cross examination as follows when discussing the payment on 
the mortgage for the Condo which was exclusively in her name: 
Q. Okay. Every time she paid First Federal, she 
wrote a check, did she not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Wrote it on her own account? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were not a joint signatory on that account? 
A. No sir. 
Appellant submits that according to Appellee himself, he 
and the decedent took on no mutuality when it came to assuming marital 
duties. 
They not only never comingled their monies, they never 
commingled their accounts, their debts, nor there personal nor 
real property. 
Yet the State Legislature clearly stated for there to 
be a common law marriage there must be a mutuality in the assumption 
of marital duties, and in this case, there was absolutely none of 
the same, and therefore this matter must be reversed, with 
instructions to probate the subject estate with the Appellant as 
the sole heir. 
ARGUMENT SEVEN 
THE DECEDENT AND THE APPELLEE DID NOT MUTUALLY 
ASSUME MARITAL OBLIGATIONS 
Appellant submits that not only is the record absolutely 
clear on the fact that the decedent and the Appellee did not at 
any time assume "marital duties", the record is equally abundantly 
clear that they never mutually assumed "marital obligations.!! 
As noted on page 44 of the transcript, Appellee testified 
that they carefully maintained their separate financial matters, 
when it came to savings, etc. 
On page 80, the Appellee confirmed the same when it came 
to "marital oligations" when he testified on cross examination 
as follows in reference to Exhibit #8: 
Q. Okay. You -- is this a refinance to bring certain 
debts into consolidation; do you know? 
A. Yeah: 
Q. Okay. So from all you know then, she was going 
to pay off the R.C. Willey debt with this loan? 
she did. 
correct? 
A. I have no doubts. And in fact, I believe that 
Q. R.C. Willey was exclusively her debt; isn't that 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let's go down below. Are you a guarantor or a 
co-maker of any leases, contracts or debts? And she says no. 
Now, is that true? 
A. Co-maker of any leases, contracts or debts. Ifs 
say that's true. 
Q. Okay. Now, let me concentrate there. She told 
the truth then in May 5th, 1992, that she didn't have any joint 
applications for debts, contracts or leases with you. 
A. None with me. 
Appellee claimed to be involved in a common law marriage 
with the decedent because they had gone on so many vacations 
together, in that they travelled a lot. 
However, a careful review of the record will show that 
the way that they would travel would confirm that they were not in 
a common law marrige, because they very meticulously took on various 
obligations, in a manner and fashion that was totally inconsistent 
with being a "married couple.11 
As noted on page 50 of the transcript, the Appellee 
testified, that they did not travel like any married couple with 
there being a sole source in which to pay for the obligations 
associated with the subject travel, rather the decedent would 
meticulously pay her part by paying for "lodging and entertainment" 
and the Appellee would pay for "transportation^and meals." 
According to the Appellee even during times that the 
decedent and Mr. Van Nood were out relaxing and away from everyone, 
in New York, and Boston and Connecticut, and Los Angeles, etc., 
they had a business relationship which called for one to pay 
for one kind of debt and the other to pay for the other kind of debt. 
Clearly, there is no basis to conclude that they "mutually 
assumed marital obligations," and therefore this Court must reverse 
and remand with instructions to probate the subject estate with 
the Appellant as the sole heir. 
ARGUMENT EIGHT 
APPELLEE AND THE DECEDENT DID NOT HOLD THEMSELVES 
OUT AS HUSBAND AND WIFE 
Under Utah Code Annotated 30-1-4.5(e), for there to be 
a common law marriage, the parties must Mhold themselves out as . . 
. .husband and wife." 
As noted above with the income tax return Exhibit #23, 
and the unemployment compensation application, Exhibit #2, the 
parties clearly did not hold themselves out as "husband and wife." 
A review of all of the exhibits produced by the Appellant, 
one through twenty three reflect the fact that the decedent clearly 
did not represent herself to be the wife of Martin Van Nood. 
Not only does the physical evidence, by way of Exhibits 
admitted into evidence clearly establish that the parties did not 
hold themselves out to be "husband and wife", the Appellee confirmed 
that same on many occasions, during the trial. 
At page 65 of the transcript, Appellee testified on 
direct examination, that the decedent could not honestly represent 
to the I.R.S. that she was married, or that she was entitled 
to file her taxes by way of a joint return. 
0. Susan filed a joint, or an individual income tax 
return for 1991, Do you know why? 
A. Well, she was a very honest, forthright person 
and I -- she felt that, in the firest place, the I.R.S. probably 
wouldn't accept as a -- as part of a joint return. And we did 
discuss -- she was in a very high tax bracket being classified 
as single and she made decent money at her work, and so paid a 
lot of taxes, but didn't get much back. We discussed several --
several methods that we could get her a better tax break. We 
talked about joint returns., but that didn't seem like one of 
the feasibilities, but were other methods that we talked about 
that might -- would have helped her." 
Appellant submits that not only did the decedent feel 
that a joint return as a married couple was dishonest, so did the 
Appellee, as he stated that they discussed the same, and knew that 
it was wrong, because it was not true. 
As noted on Exhibit 18, and also on page 76 of the 
transcript, the decedent stated, just months before she died in 
a credit application that Martin Van Nood, was a "Personal Friend -
Not a Relative." 
As noted on Exhibit 2, and on pages 81 and 82 of 
the transcript, the decedent clearly did not consider herself 
the wife of Martin Van Nood, just months before she died.: 
0. (By Mr. Walsh) She applies for workmen's -- or 
excuse me, for unemployment benefits, and she signs it down here 
on 7-6-92, Susan R. Gustaveson; fair? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Fair. 
You can see right here - -
Right. 
-- Susan R. Gustaveson here; 
Uh huh. 
fair? 
Q. Now, in reference to the darkened area here, they 
asked her a question to fill out regarding her marital status. You 
see where it says married, single, divorced, separated, widowed; do 
you see that there on Exhibit No. 2? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Same area that we're talking about here on the 
blownup of Exhibit #2, in this particular area; isn't that correct? 
A. Looks like the same area. 
Q. And when she filled out for unemployment benefits 
in July of !92, just three, four months before she died, she said 
that she was not married, not single, nor separated, nor widowed, but 
divorced, didn't she, Marty? 
A. That's what she marked. 
Appellee testified that she would go by the surname 
Van Nood, and he would go by the surname of Gustaveson, but only 
when the parties would travel to remote places. 
In fact, Appellee could only remember a single time 
in all of the six years that they dated, etc., that the decedent 
ever admitted that she was a "Van NoodTf, and even then it was 
not like she told someone that her name was Susan Van Nood, rather 
someone came to the door and asked for Mrs. Van Nood, and she 
responded, what do you want. Note pages 91 and 92, with the 
Appellee on cross examination: 
Q. Other than to travel, did Susan ever go by your name? 
A. I can only remember one specific occasion. 
Q. When was that? 
A. It was at the house, 2400 South, a door-to-door 
salesman came by and asked for Mrs. Van Nood, and she acknowledged, 
What do you want? 
Q. Did she ever sign anything saying she was Susan 
Van Nood? 
A. No. She wouldn't do that, I don't think. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Here again, I believe it was against her -- her 
standards. 
Appellant submits that according to the Appellee, it 
would be immoral and dishonest for the decedent to hold herself 
out as the wife of Martin Van Nood. 
Not only did the Appellee so testify, so did Karen 
Gallegoes, who considered the decedent as a best friend. 
On pages 104 and 105 of the transcript with Karen 
Gallegoes testifying on cross examination is the following: 
Q. Did you and she talk about the fact that Martin 
Van Nood was not a relative, was just a personal friend? 
A. No. 
Q. Is that a fair statement as to what the relationship 
was between Susan and Martin Van Nood? 
A. Just.a friend? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. No. 
Q. Susan was a very honest person, wasnft she. 
A. Yes. She was. 
Q. And when she would have signed here -- you would 
recognize that signature, wouldn't you? 
A. That's hers. 
Q. And she would of course, tell the truth when she 
filled out this, wouldn't she? 
A. I would think so. 
Q. And so as far as you know, she considered Martin a 
personal friend and not a relative; isn't that correct? 
A. Correct. Not a relative. 
Q. And that would be the case up to the time she died 
in October of 1992, isn't that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Appellee called Jet Kensington to testify, who had 
lived in the apartment complex where the decedent resided before 
she died. 
On cross examination at page 128, Mr. Jet Kensington, 
stated as follows: 
Q. Did Susan ever go by the name of Van Nood? 
Not to my knowledge. 
Do you know if Martin ever went by the last name 
Gustaveson? 
A 
Q 
husband and 
Not to my knowledge. 
You say that they held themselves out to be 
wife; do you remember saying that? 
Well, I don't know what the implication means 
nowadays of what a husband and wife are. 
Q. You observed that they were good friends? 
A. I took them to be a family. 
Q. Did they ever tell you that they were married? 
A. No. 
Q. Did Susan ever say she was the wife of Marty? 
A. Not to me, no. 
Appellant submits that the Appellee has the burden of 
proof, to show that the decedent and he held themselves out as 
"husband and wife.u 
However, he testified to the contrary, the decedent's 
best friend testified to the contrary, and the Appellee's witness 
from the apartment complex where she lived until she died, testified 
to the contrary. 
In addition to all of the above, essentially on every 
occasion when the decedent was to respond to the question of 
her marital status, and whether she was married to Martin Van 
Nood, she without any exceptions represented to the world that 
she was f,divorcedM from a William Gustaveson, and was not the 
wife of Martin Van Nood, on any Exhibit submitted to the Court. 
The State Legislature, mandated the criteria, that 
the parties ,fhold themselves out as husband and wife.11 and this 
was clearly not the case before the lower Court, and therefore 
this Court must reverse, and remand with instructions to probate 
the estate with the Appellant as the sole heir. 
ARGUMENT NINE 
APPELLEE AND THE DECEDENT DID NOT ACQUIRE A 
UNIFORM REPUTATION AS HUSBAND AND WIFE. 
According to the State Legislature not only must the 
Appellee and the decedent Mhold themselves out as husband and 
wife'1 they must have acquired a f,uniform reputation as husband 
and wife.M 
Appellant respectfully submits that since they did not 
hold themselves out as husband and wife, it follows that they 
could not have a "uniform reputation as husband and wife.M 
Still, independent of the same, the parties had not 
acquirred a "uniform reputation as husband and wife.!! 
On page 28, the sister-in-law of the decedent testified 
on direct examination as follows: 
Q. Did she ever -- did you and she ever have a 
discussion wherein she said she was married or considered herself 
married to Martin Van Nood? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know anybody else, prior to the time she 
passed away, that had that belief. 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Not only did the sister-in-law of the decedent so 
testify, so did the Appellant. The same individual listed on 
the credit application for a loan as Exhibit #18, so state on 
page 34: 
Q. Did you -- were you ever under the understanding 
that she was married to Martin Van Nood? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you "know anybody that had the belief that she 
was married to Martin Van Nood? 
A. No. 
Not only did the "Nearest relative - Not living with 
you" and her own sister-in-law, testify that they did not consider 
her to be the wife of Martin Van Nood, the Appellee testified 
that she told the truth, when she herself represented under oath, 
just months before she died that she was in fact not the Appellee!s 
wife. 
Note for example on page 83 and 84 of the transcript 
with the Appellee testifying on cross examination: 
Q. Well, let's talk about that for a minute. When 
she applies for workmen1s -- or unemployment compensation, not 
one dime of what shefs entitled to is affected by her marital 
status, isn't that correct, Marty? 
A. I'm not sure, really. 
Q. Why would she say she's divorced if she thought 
she was married to you? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. But you will certify that she always told the 
the truth? 
A. I never knew her to lie. 
Q. Let's go on to page 2. Page 2, Exhibit, Plaintiff's 
2, do you see that? 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. See here in this column on the far right column 
where it says family income and it shows a dash, does it not? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. Reflecting that there was no family income and 
that's why she was applying for work - for unemployment benefits; 
isn't that correct? 
A. She was unemployed. 
Q. But she considered --in answer to the question 
family income, she shows nothing. 
A. I -- she didn't do that, that I know of. That's 
just a print-out, isn't it? 
Q. Well, it's a print-out of what she supplied them. 
Exhibit 2 supplied, which you'll see on the face, of what they 
have there, what information she supplied them. 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. And in reference to what she supplied them, she 
shows no family income. 
A. I see that that's shown on the paper, yes. 
Q. Okay. It also says family size, one. 
A. One. 
Q. It says live-in, "N" meaning no; is that correct? 
A. I don't know what that means. 
Q. Well, if you'll look at the other columns here 
where it uses the term "Nn disabled, migrant, seasonal, public 
assistance, JTPA, DLW all show the "N". Here where it says citizen 
it shows a "Y" for yes, does it not? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. Do the "Y" would be yes, "N" would be no, from 
what --
A. It sounds logical, yeah. 
Q. Okay. So she!s representing in July that there!s 
one member of her family and there's no family income; is that 
correct? 
A. According to that, I'd say yes. 
As noted above the State Legislature, mandated that 
the parties "have acquired a uniform reputation as husband and 
wife" for bhere to be a common law marriage. 
In this case, if there was any uniformity at all 
on the subject it was pretty uniform that the decadent and the 
Appellee were in fact not husband and wife. 
As noted above, on page 91 and 92, of the transcript 
the Appellee himself stated that the decedent would have thought 
it was dishonest to sign her name as Van Nood. 
Q. Did she ever sign anything saying she was Susan 
Van Nood? 
A. No. She wouldn't do that, I don't think. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Here again, I believe it was against - her standards. 
Hence, the uniform position of the parties themselves is 
that the decedent never signed her name as Susan Van Nood. 
However, not only was such the testimony at trial from 
the Appellee himself, such was the testimony of the decedent's 
best friend, Karen Gallegoes, at page 102; 
Q. Susan never took on the name of Martin --or 
Van Nood; did she? 
A. No. 
Q. Martin never took on the name of Gustaveson, did he? 
A. No. 
Not only was the testimony from the decedent's best 
friend, Karen Gallegoes, that there was uniformity in them not 
being husband and wife, so was that exact same uniformily on there 
not being husband and wife, from Martin Van Nood's side of life. 
Harley Sells, the business partner of Mr. Van Nood, 
testified on page 121, as follows: 
Q. Did you ever know that she did, ever seen anything 
like that where she said it was Susan Van Nood? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever perceive that Marty went by the last 
name of Gustaveson? 
A. I -- no. 
Appellant submits that the record was absolutely clear 
that there was uniformity it is true, but uniformity the case 
that the parties did not acquire a reputation as husband and wife. 
Such was the testimony of the Appellee, talking about 
himself and the decedent. Such was the case with the decedent's 
best friend and such was the case with Martin Van Nood!s business 
partner. 
Still the burden of proof is on the Appellee to establish 
the evidence just the otherway around, and having failed in his 
burden of proof to show that the decedent and the Appellee "acquired 
a uniform reputation as husband and wife" this Court must reverse 
and remand with instructions to probate with the Appellant as 
the sole heir. 
ARGUMENT TEN 
APPELLEE AND THE DECEDENT DID NOT ACQUIRE A 
GENERAL REPUTATION AS HUSBAND AND WIFE 
According to 30-1-4.5(e), not only must the decedent 
and the Appellee Mhold themselves out as husband and wife" and 
that they have "acquired a uniform reputation as husabnd and wife" 
but the Appellee must establish that the parties have "acquired 
a general reputation as husband and wife." 
As noted above, the decedent was married at one time 
to a William Gustaveson, and then divorced. She however remained 
close to her in-laws after the Divorce. 
On page 111, Karen Gallegoes described the relationship 
of the decedent with her past father-in-law, Melvin Gustaveson, 
on Cross examination as follows: 
Okay. At the time that she died, Mel was a very 
friend? 
Right. 
Almost family? 
Right. 
Perhaps best described as ex-family; correct? 
close, dear 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A. I would -- well, no, I donft think so. Why, 
because she got a -- I donft think because she got a divorce, 
somebody1s considered ex; but he was a very good friend. 
Melvin Gustaveson testified similarly on pages 145 
and 146 of the transcript: 
Q. What would you -- how did you treat Susan? 
A. As part of my family. 
Q. Did you consider her as a daughter-in-law, or as a 
daughter, or --
A. As a daughter. She Stayed with all of our family 
activities. 
Q. At -- approximately how often would you see her 
after the divorce from your son? 
A. A minimum of two or three times a month 
Q. She was always family. How .many other daughters do 
you have? 
A. Two. 
Q. And did you consider Susan on an equal footing 
with your two other daughters? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did she reciprocate that feeling to you? 
A. Oh, you bet. 
Q. She considered you as her father? 
A, She used to call us Mom and Pop, all the time, 
Mom and Dad. 
Q. And she felt the same way towards your wife? 
A. Yes. 
Not only did the decedent's best friend Karen Gallegoes 
so testify, as did Melvin Gustaveson, but so did the Appellee 
so testify on page 85: 
Q. Do y<?u know who filled out the death certificate? 
correct? 
A 
Q 
No. 
The person we are talking about is Mel Gustaveson; 
Oh. Of course. I saw that on there, yeah. 
Okay. So1, Mel Gustaveson would be the closest 
friend that you're telling us about on direct examination; isn't 
that correct? 
A. Friend isn't the right term, but a very close 
person to her. 
Q. Okay. I don!t want to argue with you, but why 
isnft "friend" appropriate to describe Mel's relationship 
with her? 
A. She called him Dad. 
Q. So it!s closer than friendship? 
A. I'd say it is, yes. 
Q. Okay. Mel, when he supplies the information as 
reflected on Plaintiff1s Exhibit 15, doesn't say she's married 
when she dies, does he? 
A. No, he doesn't 
Q. He says ithat she's divorced - -
A. Yes. 
Hence, in regards to the decedent and the Appellee 
having "acquired a general reputation as husband and wife" it is 
absolutely clear that the person who was "family to the decedent" 
represented on the Death Certificate, not that she was married 
to Martin Van Nood when she died, rather her "father" stated that 
she was divorced from his own son. 
Not only did this immediate family address the "general 
reputation" of the Appellee and the Decedent, so did the daughter 
of the Appellee by a prior marriage. 
According to the daughter of Mr. Martin Van Nood, who 
lived with the decedent and her father for some time, and who 
called the decedent her Mom, etc, as found on pages 140 and 141 
of the transcript, the decedent and the Appellee did not have 
a general reputation as husband and wife, as they only represented 
themselves as such, when they traveled. 
On pages 143 and 144, Julia Tso, testified as follows: 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Gustaveson? 
Did Susan go by the name of Van Nood? 
Van Nood. 
Excuse me, did she ever go by that name? 
Not -- not to my knowledge. I know of --
And did Martin ever go by the last name of 
A. Just on their trips is all I know. 
Not only did essentially all who testified state that 
they had not acquired a Tfgeneral reputation as husband and wif e", 
but perhaps most importantly, so did the exhibits reflecting what 
the decedent herself stated under oath shortly before she died. 
Karen Gallegoes went with the decedent to file for 
unemployment benefits together, and Karen Gallegoes testified 
on page 103 and 106 of the transcript as follows: 
Q. So she considered herself at best a fiance to 
Martin and not -- and not his wife, isnft that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, she took out a credit application in 1992. 
Did you and she talk about that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Go down in May of f92, it would be around the 
time that things were falling apart there at KALL Radio --
A. Right. 
Q. -- isn't that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And do you know if -- in that regard, if she 
would represent herself as being married or single? 
A. Single. 
Q. So at the time of May of '92, she considered 
herself a single person; isn't that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. At the time that she died, she considered herself 
a single person, didn't she? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. Drawing your attention to Page 2 of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, over on the left-hand column says that 
her family income is zip; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Family size was one, is that correct? 
A. Yes. Well, if it says one, it says one. 
Hence, Appellant submits that if there was any proof 
of the general reputation as husband and wife" it was the general 
reputation that they were not, as such was the testimony of the 
decedent's "father", the decedent's daughter by association; the 
decedent herself and the Appellee himself. 
There is absolutely no basis whatsoever for the lower 
Court to hold that the decedent and the Appellee "acquired a 
general reputation as husband and wife", and therefore this Court 
must reverse and remand with instructions that the probate be 
completed with the Appellant as the sole heir. 
CONCLUSION 
In this action, the Appellant went forward with his 
case first by stipulation, notbecause he had any burden of proof 
whatsoever, but merely for convenience sake. This was because 
it was a probate matter, and the title for the parties did not 
fall neatly into place with the terms Plaintiff/Defendant. 
The Appellee was required to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that there was a common law marriage. 
The only way that one can be in a common law marriage 
is if they meet the specific requirements of 30-1-4.5. Each 
and every element must be met, for if there is a failure to meet 
any one of the criteria, then there is no common law marriage. 
The Appellate Courts have reviewed the provisions of 
30-1-4.5 in only four cases. None of the same shed any light 
on the interpretation of the statute, except to say that the only 
way one can be in a common law marriage in Utah, is by strict 
compliance with the statute. Note Mattes vs. Olearain, 759 
P.2d 1177 (Utah App. 1988) , Barber vs. Barber, 792 P.2d 134, 
(Utah App. 1990), Walters vs. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 
1991), and Van Per Stappen vs. Van Per Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335 
(Utah App. 1991). 
In this case, what the decedent said both in a loan 
application in May of '92, and in a claim for unemployment benefits 
in July, 1992, should be dispositive, as she died in October, 1992. 
Clearly, under oath, and just months before she died 
she certified that they were not husband and wife; that they did 
not mutually assume marital rights, duties and obligations; and 
that they did not hold themselves out as and had not acquired a 
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. 
Appellee gave her a engagement ring, which was 
considered by the world to be a commitment to get married. In 
fact, the decedent and the Appellee went looking for their new 
home together, as they were going to be getting married, and 
they would need a home that would be theirs together. Not the 
I own mine and you 0wn yours, as it had been in the past. 
These folks did absolutely nothing to suggest that 
they had already made a commitment of marriage to one another. They 
did not commingle their accounts, they had no contracts for debts, 
they had absolutely nothing to suggest that they had a marriage 
here and now, as opposed to a marriage into the future, when 
they get their new house, etc. 
Appellant submits that the policy of the State 
Legislature is that since the parties have themselves entered 
into a marriage of accounts, debts, duties, obligation, etc., 
the Courts should acknowledge the same. 
Here, there is no mutuality at all, except two young 
folks who move in together, and pay the day to day expenses, 
individually from very separate and distinct accounts. 
Appellant submits that the lower Court erred, in that 
it failed to apply the correct interpretation of the statute, and 
concluded that since they had lived together for so long, well 
they had to^ bfe married - such is not the case with the mandate 
with the State Legislature. 
Appleeant respectfully requests that the ruling by 
the lower Court be reversed with instructions to probate the 
subject matter, with the Appellant as the sole heir. 
Dated this 7 ^ day of October., 199T 
J0HK/T7ALSH 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered two (2) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
to the Appellee, by personally delivering the same to WILLIAIl 
J. DALGLIESH, ATTORNEY AT LAW, 243 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 303, 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84111, this 7th day of 
JOHN WALSH 
?T0RNEY AT LAW 
ADDENDUM - 930439^-CA 
WILLIAM J. M. DALGLIESH #810 
24 3 EAST FOURTH SOUTH #30 3 
SALT LAKE CITY^_IJTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: (801) 532-6536 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF : ORDER DETERMINING VALIDITY 
OF MARRIAGE 
SUSAN RENAE SORENSEN GUSTAVESON, : 
Case No- 922901280ES 
Deceased. : 
Judge: Richard Moffat 
This natter came on regularly for trial on the 25th day of March, 1993, 
before the Honorable Richard Moffat, one of the judges of the above-entitled 
Court. Petitioner, Orin T. Sorensen appeared in person and with Counsel, 
John Walsh.. Respondent, Martin Van Nood appeared in person and with 
Counsel, William J. M. Dalgliesh. The matter at issue was an objection 
filed by Martin Van Nood to the appointment of Orin T. Sorensen as the 
personal rerpesentative of the Estate of Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson, 
on the basis that Mr. Van Nood has priority of appointment as the 
husband of the decedent, over that of Orin T. Sorensen, the brother 
of the decedent, and to declare a valid marriage existed between 
the decedent and Mr. Van Nood, under the provisons of §30-1-4.5, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amsnded; and that the marriage 
was legal and valid. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of the petitioner, 
the respondent, and numerous witnesses, and having considered the 
evidence, including the exhibits submitted by the parties, and 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
be fully oognizant of the issues, new enters the foliating 
Older: 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Martin Van Nood and Susan Renae Sorensen Gustaveson 
entered into a contract of marriage which was legal and valid and 
in effect at the date of Susan Renae Sorensen Gustavesonfs death, 
and Martin Van Nood and Susan Renae Sorensen Gustaveson were husband 
and wife at the date of the death of Susan Renae Sorensen Gustaveson. 
2. The determination of who should be the personal 
representative of the Estate of Susan Renae Sorensen Gustaveson 
is referred bade to the probate divsions of this Court for final 
determination, to be made consistant with this Order, 
Dated this day of April, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Richard Moffat 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form and content: 
John Walsh-
Attorney for Petitioner 
CEKTIFiaffiE CF HAND DELIVERY 
I, William J. M. Dalgliesh, do hereby certify that I 
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
DETEIMTNING VMiTDITY CF MARRIAGE to Petitioner's attorney, 
Jchn Walsh., at his office located at 2319 Feethill Drive, Suite 270, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109, this 31st day of March, 1993. 
Williar/J. M. Dalaliesh 
WILLIAM J. M. DAiGLIESR #810 
243 EAST FOURTH SOUTH #30 3 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: (801), 532-6536 
ATTORNEY FOR 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
SUSAN RANAE SORENSEN GUSTAVESON: 
Case No.922901280 ES 
Deceased. : 
Judge: Richard Moffat 
This natter came en regularly for trial on the 25th day of March, 1993, 
before the Honorable Ridaard Moffatt, one of the judges of the above-entitled 
Court. Petitioner, Qrin T. Sorensen appeared in person and with Counsel, 
John Walsh. Respondert, Martin Van Nood appeared in person and with 
Counsel, William J. M* Dalgliesh. The matter at issue was an cbjection 
filed by Martin Van Nood to the appointmant of Qrin T. Sorensen as the 
personal representative of the Estate of Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson, 
on the basis that Mr. Van Nood has priority of appointment as the 
common law husband of the decedent, over that of Mr. Sorensen, the 
brother of the decedent. The trial was held to declare that Mr. Van Nood 
was the husband of the decedent, under the provisions of §30-1-4.5, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended; and that the marriage was legal 
and valid. 
The Court, having heard the testdjiiony of the petitioner, 
respondent and numerous other witnesses, and having considered the 
evidence, including the exhibits submitted by the parties, and being 
fully advised in the premises, new makes, adopts and ifles its: 
FINDINGS CF FACT 
1. Respondent, Martin Van Nood, and the decedent, Susan 
Gustaveson lived together on a constant basis, as husband and wife, 
from June, 1988 until the death of Susan Gustaveson on October 19, 
1992. 
2. Respondent and the decedent first lived together in the 
hcne of the respondent, and then moved to the home of the decedent in 
May, 1991, where they resided until Susan Gustaveson's death. 
3. At the time the respondent and the decedent conmenced 
residing together, the respondent was 41 years of age, and the 
decedent was 36 years of age, both of legal age to contract a marriage. 
4. Both the respondent and the decedent were divorced from 
other persons at the time they commenced their marriage relationship 
with each other. Respondents divorce frcm his first spouse was final on 
October 1, 1982, and the decedent fs divorce from her first spouse 
was final on February/ 22, 1982. 
5. This action was brought within one year following the 
termination of the relationship of the respondent and the decedent, 
said termination caused by the death of Susan Gustaveson. 
6. That the respondent and the decedent cohabited for a 
period of approxiirately four and one half years; and had sexual 
relations with. each, other during that time. 
7. That the respondent and the decedent mutually assumed 
maritial rights, duties, and obligations during their relationship, 
in that they did the following acts together: 
a. They engaged in a sexual relationship. 
b. They maintained,'their home together for themselves 
for four and one half years; and they raised the minor daughter of 
the respondent together for threeyears, until she married and moved 
from the family home. The decedent treated respondent's daughter 
as her cwn daughter, .and considered respondent's grandchild as her 
cwn grandchild. 
c. Each, contributed financial support to the household 
expenses; and they purchased furniture and hone inprovements for 
themselves. 
d. They received mail together. 
e. They exchanged gifts with each other and family 
merrbers; and received gifts from family menbers. 
f. They shared in the normal household duties of 
a married couple: cooking, cleaning, hone repairs, care of a child, 
travel, entertainment both in the home and attendance of social 
activities, outside of the hone with friends and co-workers. 
g. Ihe decedent contributed financial support to 
the respondent's business by purchasing the business a computer, 
h. Ihey shared activities as husband and wife with 
respondents child, such as camping, attendance as "parents'1 at 
the child's high school graduation, marriage, and birth of her 
child. 
8. Ihe respondent and the decedent held themselves out and acquired 
a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.in the following 
manner: 
a. Neighbors considered them to be husband and wife. 
b. Fellow co-workers and the employer of the decedent 
and the former husband of the decedent and his parents regarded them 
as husband and wife. 
c. Travel arrangements were made as husband and wife. 
d. Ihey shopped together as husband and wife for household 
wares., and for a new hone. 
e. Ihey held themselves out as husband and wife to their 
friends, relatives, and general public. 
§. Ihat the parties made an oral contract of marriage 
between thaiiselves. 
10. . That each was capable of giving consent to a marriage 
between themselves. . . . 
11. That the marriage of the respondent and the decedent 
was not solemnized. 
12. That the respondent and the decedent were each legally 
capable of entering inro a solemnized marriage under the provisions 
of Title 30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
13. That Orin T. Sorensen is the brother of the decedent. 
Frcm the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court new makes, 
adopts and files its: 
CCNCLUSICNS CF IM? 
1. The Court has- jurisdiction in this matter. 
2. The respondent and the decedent entered into a marriage, 
which was not solemnized, but which is a valid marriage. 
3. That each was capable of giving consent to a solemnized 
marriage. 
4. That each was legally capable of entering a solemnized 
marriage under the provisions of Title 30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. 
5. That the parties cchabited. 
6. That each mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and 
obligations. 
7. That the respondent and the decedent held themselves 
out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband 
and wife. 
8. That an Order and Judgment .should be entered, declaring 
that Martin Van Nood and Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson ^ here 
validly married at the time and date of the death of Susan Ranae 
Sorensen Gustaveson. 
9. That this matter should be referred back to the 
probate calendar for determation of who should be the personal 
representative of the Estate of Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson, 
based upon the Order and Judgment to be entered herein. 
Dated this day of April, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Richard Moffat 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form and content: 
John Walsh-
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICaTE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I, William J, M. Dalgliesh, do hereby certify that I 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions to Petitioner's attorney, John 
Walsh, at his office located at 2319 Foothill Drive, Suite 270, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84109, this J1 day of March, 1993. 
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